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Abstract	
	
This	 paper	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 draw	 an	 overall	 picture	 of	 the	 transmission	 mechanism	 of	
macroeconomic	policy	tools	(fiscal,	exchange	rate	and	monetary	policies)	in	a	national	economy	
during	the	classical	gold	standard.	I	present	the	empirical	results	based	on	the	SVAR	framework.	
An	 SVAR	analysis	 reveals	 that	 adjustments	 in	 exchange	 rates	 and	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	
pursued	as	policy	tools	played	an	important	role	in	the	recoveries	that	followed	declines	in	GDP	
in	the	period	1874-1913.	In	the	face	of	dramatic	economic	shocks,	the	rigidities	of	the	monetary	
system	 inhibited	 recovery,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery.	 None	 of	 these	 policy	
options	would	have	been	available	under	the	gold	standard	and	the	impact	of	fluctuations	in	the	
economic	cycle	would	have	been	much	greater.	My	analysis	sheds	new	light	on	the	conduct	of	
macroeconomic	policy	in	Spain	during	the	classical	Gold	gold	standard.	The	level	of	the	exchange	
rate	was	key	since	it	helped	to	improve	the	terms	of	trade,	promoted	exports	and	raised	prices	
at	 a	 time	when	 the	West	 suffered	 from	 the	problems	of	 deflation.	 The	 results	 in	 this	 paper	
provide	 new	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 the	 core-periphery	 debate	 addressing	 the	 period	 of	 the	
classical	gold	standard.	
	
Key	words:	Classical	Gold	Standard,	Spain,	Exchange	Rate,	Monetary	Policy,	Fiscal	Policy,	
SVAR.	
	
JEL	codes:	E42,	E52,	E63,	N10	
	
	
Resumen	
	
Este	 artículo	 pretende	 trazar	 un	 visión	 general	 de	 los	 mecanismo	 de	 transmisión	 de	 los	
instrumentos	 de	 política	 macroeconómica	 (política	 fiscal,	 cambiaria	 and	 monetaria)	 en	 una	
economía	nacional	durante	el	patrón	oro	clásico.	Presento	los	resultados	empíricos	basados	en	
un	modelo	 SVAR.	 El	 análisis	 SVAR	 señala	 que	 los	 ajustes	 del	 tipo	 de	 cambio	 and	 la	 política	
monetaria	and	fiscal,	entendidas	como	instrumentos	de	política,	jugaron	un	papel	importante	
en	las	recuperaciones	que	siguieron	a	las	caídas	del	PIB	durante	el	periodo	1874-1913.	Frente	a	
los	 grandes	 impactos	 económicos,	 las	 rigideces	 del	 sistema	 monetario	 imposibilitaban	 las	
recuperaciones,	 particularmente,	 en	 los	 países	 de	 la	 periferia.	 Ninguna	 de	 estas	 políticas	 se	
hubiera	podido	llevar	a	cabo	dentro	del	patrón	oro	habiendo	sido	el	impacto	de	las	fluctuaciones	
del	 ciclo	 mucho	 mayor.	 Mi	 análisis	 arroja	 nueva	 luz	 sobre	 el	 funcionamiento	 de	 la	 política	
macroeconómica	en	España	durante	el	patrón	oro	clásico.	El	nivel	del	tipo	de	cambio	fue	clave	
ya	 que	 ayudó	 a	 mejorar	 los	 términos	 de	 intercambio,	 promoviendo	 exportaciones	 e	
incrementando	los	precios	mientras	Occidente	sufría	problemas	de	deflación.	Los	resultados	del	
trabajo	aportan	nueva	evidencia	en	el	debate	centro-periferia	para	el	periodo	conocido	como	
patrón	oro	clásico.	
Palabras	clave:	Patrón	oro	clásico,	España,	Tipo	de	cambio,	Política	monetaria,	Política	fiscal,	
SVAR.	
Códigos	JEL:	E42,	E52,	E63,	N10	 	
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“(...)	 in	no	way	does	the	fall	of	the	peseta	seem	to	me	
synonymous	 with	 weakness.	 The	 freedom	 to	 allow	 a	
certain	 moderate	 slackening	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 in	
times	 of	 general	 depression	 affecting	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
world	 can	be	a	 valuable	measure	 to	maintain	 internal	
stability,	which	would	otherwise	be	impossible.”		
J.	M.	Keynes,	 interviewed	in	El	Sol	by	Luís	de	Olariaga,	
10	June	1930	
I.	Introduction	
	
The	study	of	the	gold	standard	has	grown	in	importance	as	a	consequence	of	the	euro	crisis	and	
the	 issues	 created	 by	 relinquishing	 monetary	 sovereignty	 (Stiglitz,	 2016,	 p.	 12).	 The	 euro	
generated	the	same	rigidities	in	Europe	that	the	gold	standard	once	imposed	on	the	world.	The	
economies	on	the	southern	periphery	of	Europe	did	not	succeed	in	remaining	within	the	rules	
of	the	classical	gold	standard1.	These	are	the	same	countries	that	have	struggled	to	overcome	
the	recent	economic	crisis	in	the	context	of	the	single	currency	(Eichengreen,	2015,	pp.	12,	13	
and	93).	Fixed	exchange	rates	facilitate	trade	and	investment	flows	in	times	of	prosperity,	but			
they	exacerbate	problems	in	times	of	crisis	(Eichengreen	and	Temin,	2010,	p.	370)2.	To	overcome	
major	crises,	there	is	a	need	for	the	stimulus	of	expansionary	monetary	and	fiscal	policy,	as	well	
as	a	flexible	exchange	rate.			
This	paper	seeks	to	analyse	the	rigidities	in	the	gold	standard	using	the	Spanish	case	in	order	to	
draw	lessons	for	the	present	day.	One	of	the	successes	of	the	system	was	to	keep	exchange	rates	
stable	in	much	of	the	world	(Triffin,	1985,	p.	12;	Eichengreen,	1992,	pp.	4-8).	The	gold	standard	
created	a	climate	without	monetary	shocks	and	this,	according	to	its	proponents,	contributed	
to	 economic	 growth.	 Membership	 in	 the	 gold	 standard	 was	 a	 sign	 of	 good	 conduct	 and	 it	
resulted	 in	benefits	 such	as	 lower	 interest	 rates,	a	decrease	 in	 fiscal	deficits,	 lower	 inflation,	
																																								 																				
1	For	the	Italian	case,	see	Fratianni	and	Spinelli	(1984),	Cipolla	(1995),	Tattara	(1997,	2000	and	2003),	Bordo	(1999,	p.	
328)	and	Frattiani	and	Spinelli	(2012).	For	the	Portuguese	case,	see	Mata	(1987),	Reis	(1996,	2000	and	2007),	Valerio	
(1998)	and	Bordo	(1999,	p.	329).	For	an	analysis	of	the	gold	standard	in	Greece,	see	Lazaretou	(1995	and	2005).	
2	Also,	Varoufakis	(2016),	p.	37,	highlights	the	relationship	between	the	rigidities	of	the	euro	and	those	of	the	gold	
standard.	
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better	access	to	capital	markets	and	lower	transaction	costs	(Bordo	and	Rockoff,	1996,	pp.	389-
396	and	López-Córdoba	and	Meissner,	2003,	p.	344).		
The	positive	effects	of	stability	and	growth	were	generally	limited	to	the	advanced	economies.	
A	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery	 experienced	 major	 exchange	 rate	
fluctuations	and	instability	(Triffin,	1985,	p.	128).	If	the	economies	of	the	periphery	wished	to	
join	the	gold	standard,	they	were	required	to	enact	painful,	sometimes	untenable	adjustments	
to	 their	 national	 economy3.	 The	 countries	 of	 Europe’s	 southern	 periphery,	 such	 as	 Italy	 and	
Portugal,	 were	 unable	 to	 remain	within	 the	 gold	 standard.	 The	 structural	 problems	 of	 their	
economies	prevented	them	from	bringing	their	money	supply	under	control	and	keeping	their	
exchange	rate	stable.					
The	 economies	 on	 the	 periphery	 were	 debtors	 in	 the	 global	 financial	 system,	making	 them	
vulnerable	to	the	withdrawal	of	funds	in	times	of	financial	constraint	(De	Cecco,	1974;	Temin,	
1995,	 p.	 28	 and	 Bordo	 Flandreau,	 2003,	 p.	 420).	 Countries	 outside	 the	 gold	 standard	 used	
fluctuations	in	the	exchange	rate	to	cushion	the	impact	of	economic	shocks	(Bordo	and	Rockoff,	
1996,	p.	416;	Bordo	and	Flandreau,	2003,	p.	419)4.	In	addition,	speculation	was	a	key	problem	
under	the	gold	standard.	A	loss	of	confidence	would	spark	a	speculative	attack	on	the	currency	
in	question	(Eichengreen,	1996,	pp.	46-49;	Bordo	and	Jonung,	2001,	p.	14,	and	Bernanke,	2015,	
p.	26).	Credibility	varied	enormously	between	the	core	and	the	periphery	(Hallwood	et	al.,	1996,	
p.	129ff;	Bordo	and	Flandreau,	2003,	p.	446;	Bordo	and	MacDonald,	2005,	p.	326	and	Mitchener,	
Shizume	 and	 Weidenmier,	 2010,	 p.	 54).	 The	 interest	 rate,	 which	 served	 as	 an	 adjustment	
mechanism	for	the	countries	at	the	core,	did	not	work	for	the	periphery	(Morys,	2013,	p.	205,	
and	Triffin,	1997,	p.	128).	Banks	in	the	core	countries	would	assist	one	another	(Flandreau,	1998,	
pp.	737	and	761),	whereas	they	would	not	help	the	countries	on	the	periphery5.		
Studying	 the	 individual	 experiences	 of	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery	 under	 the	 classical	 gold	
standard	has	enhanced	our	understanding	of	 the	periphery	 in	 this	 period.	 In	 short,	 the	 gold	
standard	 was	 a	 constraint	 on	 potential	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 actions	 in	 reaction	 to	
																																								 																				
3	Braga	de	Macedo	(1996),	p.	243	and	Martín	Aceña,	Reis	and	Llona	(2000),	p.	2.	For	additional	information	on	the	
main	characteristics	of	the	gold	standard,	see	Temin	(1995,	p.	25).	
4	Cipolla	(1995),	p.	132,	emphasises	that,	in	the	Italian	case,	compulsory	legal	tender	acted	as	a	social	and	economic	
cushion.	 Crafts,	 N.,	 &	Mills,	 T.	 C.	 (2013)	 find	 that	 the	 abandonment	 of	 fixed	 exchange	 rates	 enabled	 the	 British	
economy	to	overcome	the	depression	of	the	thirties	by	gaining	control	of	its	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	and	being	
able	to	lower	interest	rates.		
5	For	additional	information,	see	Eichengreen,	1995.	
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fluctuations	in	the	economic	cycle	(Bordo	and	Kydland,	1995,	pp.	436-441;	Bordo	and	Jonung,	
2001,	pp.	12-13,	and	Bernanke,	1995,	pp.	11-12)6.		
The	 case	 of	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 analyse	 the	 behaviour	 of	
macroeconomic	 variables	 in	 the	 only	 Western	 country	 to	 remain	 always	 outside	 the	 gold	
standard7.	There	is	no	consensus	over	whether	the	non-adoption	of	the	gold	standard	benefited	
or	 harmed	 Spain’s	 economic	 growth8.	 The	 proponents	 of	 a	 fixed	 exchange	 rate	 stress	 that	
growth	would	have	been	greater	under	the	gold	standard.	However,	keeping	a	flexible	exchange	
rate	and	freedom	of	choice	in	macroeconomic	policy	did	succeed	in	dampening	the	impact	of	
fluctuations	in	the	economic	cycle	experienced	by	Spain	during	the	classical	gold	standard.	For	
this	reason,	the	following	study	aims	to	analyse	whether	the	tools	of	monetary,	exchange	rate	
and	fiscal	policy	had	a	real	effect	on	Spain’s	economy	between	1874	and	1913.		
The	paper	covers	the	period	known	as	the	classical	gold	standard.	Spain	had	a	de	jure	bimetallic	
standard	over	the	period.	Nevertheless,	in	the	late	eighteen-eighties,	the	country	is	regarded	to	
have	had	a	de	facto	fiduciary	system	in	that	the	real	value	of	silver	was	lower	than	its	face	value	
and	there	were	constant	outflows	of	gold.	Over	the	entire	period,	Spain	 increased	 its	money	
supply,	 maintained	 constant	 budget	 deficits	 and	 experienced	 a	 major	 depreciation	 of	 its	
currency.			
From	1874,	after	granting	the	Banco	de	España	a	monopoly	on	the	issue	of	banknotes,	the	state	
could	resort	to	increasing	the	amount	of	banknotes	in	circulation	(Figure	1)	to	solve	its	treasury	
problems.	The	issue	limit	imposed	on	the	Banco	de	España	was	raised	various	times,	enabling	
the	money	supply	to	be	increased9.	The	decree	of	14	July	1891	raised	the	limit	to	1,500	million	
pesetas	(Sardà,	1987,	p.	180).	Subsequently,	in	1898,	the	limit	was	again	increased,	this	time	to	
																																								 																				
6	See	footnote	1.	
7		Sardà	(1987),	Martín	Aceña	(1981)	p.	267,	Martín	Aceña	(1993)	p.	135,	Tortella	(1994)	p.	323,	Serrano	(2004)	p.	155,	
García	Iglesias	(2005)	p.	62,	Sabaté,	Gadea	and	Escario	(2006),	p.	310,	Nogues	and	Martínez	Ruíz	(2011)	p.	3,	Martínez	
Ruíz	and	Nogues	(2014)	pp.	9	and	19.	
8	On	one	hand,	Sardà	(1987),	Solé	Villalonga	(1964,	1967)	and	Tortella	(1981,	1994)	defended	a	position	contrary	to	
the	gold	standard.	Their	argument	is	based	on	the	impossibility	of	taking	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	actions	under	the	
gold	standard.	More	recently,	this	stance	has	been	defended	by	Cubel	et	al	(1998);	Catalan,	Sudrià	and	Tirado	(2001);	
Cubel	(2001);	Llona	(2001);	Ródenas,	Brú	and	Almenar	(2001);	and	Sabaté,	Gadea	and	Serrano	(2001),	Carreras	and	
Tafunell	(2004,	pp.	219-20),	Serrano	(2004)	and	Bru	and	Ródenas	(2006).	This	school	of	thought	is	called	the	“classical	
thesis”	and	is	associated	with	Professor	Joan	Sardà.	On	the	other	hand,	Martín	Aceña	(1981,	1993,	1997	and	2000)	
defends	the	critical	thesis,	viewing	it	as	a	mistake	not	to	have	adopted	the	gold	standard.	Aceña,	a	professor	at	the	
University	of	Alcalá,	holds	that	Spanish	growth	would	have	been	greater	under	the	gold	standard.	See	Martín	Aceña,	
Martínez	Ruiz	and	Nogues	(2011)	and	Martínez	Ruiz	and	Nogues	(2014),	among	others.	In	an	intermediate	position	
in	the	debate,	we	can	find	García	Iglesias	(2005)	and	Prados	de	la	Escosura	(2003).	For	additional	information	on	the	
issue,	see	Roldan	(2016).	
9	Sardà	(1987),	p.	176,	the	situation	in	1883	could	only	be	resisted	through	an	increase	in	the	money	stock.	
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2,500	million	 pesetas10.	 Finally,	 in	 a	 last	 attempt	 to	 improve	 the	 price	 of	 the	 peseta	 on	 the	
international	market	 and	 reduce	public	debt,	 the	 limit	was	 lowered	 to	2,000	million	pesetas	
because	of	a	tighter	monetary	policy	than	in	the	preceding	years11.	The	increase	in	banknotes	in	
circulation	was	tied	to	the	state’s	budgetary	policy12.	
	
Figure	1:	Evolution	of	output	(real	pc	GDP	in	million	pesetas),	price	index,	fiscal	balance	(in	percentage	of	
real	GDP),	exchange	 rate	 (real	effective	exchange	 rate)	and	money	 stock	 (real	M1	 in	million	pesetas).	
Everything	is	in	1913	pesetas.	
Source:	see	text.	
																																								 																				
10	The	Cuban	uprising	forced	the	Ministry	of	Overseas	Territories	to	resort	to	the	issue	of	banknotes,	Sardà	(1987,	p.	
190).	
11	These	types	of	tighter	policies	are	associated	with	Villaverde.	Raimundo	Fernández	Villaverde	was	Chancellor	of	the	
Exchequer	in	1899-1900	and	1902-1903.	Later,	he	was	prime	minister	in	1903	and	1905.	His	policies	involved	carrying	
out	a	financial	restructuring	to	put	the	system	on	a	sound	footing	again	and	halting	the	depreciation	of	the	currency.	
In	1908	these	policies	were	abandoned	when	signs	of	domestic	slump	appeared	(Sardà,	1982,	p.	202).		
12	Escario	et	al	(2011)	observe	a	strong	causality	between	the	budget	and	changes	in	the	monetary	base	between	
1875	and	1998.	
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From	1874	to	1899,	deficits	were	recurring	(Figure	1).	The	exchange	rate	was	flexible	from	the	
late	 eighteen-eighties,	 losing	 value	 particularly	 between	 1888	 and	 1900.	 The	 exchange	 rate	
depreciated	 by	 26.6%	 between	 1883	 and	 1891.	 By	 contrast,	 between	 1893	 and	 1898	 the	
depreciation	was	36%,	 the	highest	 in	 the	period	 (Figure	1).	Could	any	of	 these	policies	have	
encouraged	 growth	 in	 the	 Spanish	 economy?	Did	 these	 policies	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 real	
economy?	If	they	did,	was	the	impact	negative	or	positive?			
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	determine	whether	the	benefits	of	being	outside	the	gold	standard	
had	an	impact	on	Spain’s	real	economy	between	1874	and	1913	and,	if	so,	what	the	impact	was.	
In	other	words,	the	focus	is	to	investigate,	at	a	quantitative	level,	the	role	played	by	economic	
policy	tools	on	the	cycle’s	fluctuations.	The	Spanish	economy	during	the	gold	standard	offers	an	
interesting	case	study	because	Spain	was	the	only	country	to	remain	always	outside	the	gold	
standard.	The	paper	analyses	the	dynamic	relationship	between	macroeconomic	variables	and	
seeks	 to	 estimate	 the	 magnitude	 of	 their	 effects.	 To	 this	 end,	 an	 SVAR	 (structural	 vector	
autoregression)	 model	 is	 constructed	 using	 two	 variables	 relating	 to	 the	 state	 of	 the	 real	
economy	 and	 three	 economic	 policy	 variables13.	 The	 SVAR	 analysis	 treats	 the	 variables	
symmetrically,	adjusting	a	regression	of	each	variable	over	a	constant,	with	a	certain	number	of	
lags	for	each	variable	and	the	same	number	of	lags	for	the	other	variables	in	the	SVAR	model14.	
The	main	advantage	of	using	an	SVAR	model	is	that,	with	relatively	few	assumptions,	it	can	give	
consistent	and	asymptotically	efficient	estimations	that	make	it	possible	to	observe	causality.	
For	 the	 Spanish	 case,	 this	 type	 of	 study	 has	 no	 precedents	 for	 the	 period	 spanning	 the	 late	
nineteenth	and	early	 twentieth	 centuries.	However,	 the	methodology	has	been	used	by	Cha	
(2003)	 and	 by	 Shibamoto	 and	 Shizume	 (2014)	 to	 capture	 the	 magnitudes	 of	 the	 effects	 of	
macroeconomic	policies	in	Japan,	by	Gordon	and	Krenn	(2010)	to	measure	the	same	effects	in	
the	US,	and	by	Mattesini	and	Quintieri	 (1997)	 in	the	Italian	case,	among	others15.	Shibamoto	
and	Shizume	 (2014)	have	 studied	 the	 impact	of	monetary,	 fiscal	and	exchange	 rate	policy	 in	
Japan	during	the	inter-war	period.	This	paper	follows	the	analyses	carried	out	by	the	authors	
mentioned	above.		
																																								 																				
13	A	formal	explanation	of	structural	vector	autoregressions	can	be	found	in	Bernanke	(1986)	and	Sims	(1986).	
14	Christiano	et	al.	(1999)	use	SVAR	to	study	the	transmission	mechanism	of	monetary	policy.	Blanchard	and	Quah	
(1989)	popularised	the	use	of	SVAR	models	in	the	analysis	of	fluctuations	in	the	economic	cycle.	Blanchard	and	Perotti	
(2002)	obtain	the	dynamic	effects	produced	by	shocks	in	fiscal	spending	and	taxes.	
15	For	the	English	case,	see	an	analysis	of	monetary	policy	in	Jeanne	(1995).	
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The	sample	is	small.	Nevertheless,	there	are	examples	of	similar	studies	with	comparable	sample	
sizes16.	 The	most	 important	 limitation	 is	 that	 the	 results	 from	 a	 small	 sample	 can	 be	more	
imprecise.	This	paper	confirms	how	expansionary	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	and	adjustments	in	
the	 exchange	 rate	 played	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 Spain’s	 economic	 development.	 Expansionary	
monetary	policy	was	an	effective	way	to	foster	economic	growth	in	the	period.	It	was	adapted	
in	response	to	the	country’s	economic	conditions	and	treasury	problems.	The	effects	of	fiscal	
policy	were	not	as	great,	but	they	did	exist.	Having	a	flexible	exchange	rate	proved	crucial	to	
sustaining	 Spanish	 economic	 growth	 and	 being	 able	 to	 overcome	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 cycle,	
promoting	exports	and	raising	domestic	prices,	while	avoiding	deflation	abroad.		
The	paper	is	organised	as	follows:	section	2	describes	the	methodology	and	the	data;	section	3	
presents	 the	 empirical	 results;	 section	 4	 discusses	 the	 results	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 historical	
evidence	and	previous	literature;	and	lastly	section	5	puts	forward	a	conclusion.			
II.	Methodology	and	data	
	
This	section	describes	the	econometric	tools	and	data	used	to	estimate	the	effects	of	monetary,	
fiscal	 and	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 on	 real	 GDP.	 To	 achieve	 this	 aim	 and	 analyse	 the	 dynamic	
relationship	between	macroeconomic	variables,	the	following	VAR	model	is	constructed	using	
the	variables	of	output	(𝑦"),	price	index	(𝑝"),	fiscal	balance	(𝑓"),	exchange	rate	(𝑒")	and	money	
stock	(𝑚"):	 𝐵 𝐿 𝑋" = 𝑏, + ɛ"	
where	 𝑋" = 𝑦", 𝑝", 𝑓", 𝑒", 𝑚" ,	 𝑏,is	 the	 vector	 of	 the	 constant,	 𝐵 𝐿 = 𝐵, − 𝐵1𝐿1 − ⋯−𝐵3𝐿3	is	a	p-th	order	lag	that	forms	a	matrix	𝐵5 = 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝 	such	that	the	diagonal	elements	
of	 𝑏,	 are	 equivalent	 to	 1	 and	 ɛ" = ɛ9", ɛ3", ɛ:", ɛ;", ɛ<" 	 is	 a	 five-by-one	 vector	 of	 serially	
uncorrelated	structural	disturbances	with	a	mean	zero	and	a	covariance	matrix	Σɛ.	Following	the	
order	of	Shibamoto	and	Shizume	(2014),	the	macroeconomic	variables	are	put	first	(real	GDP	
and	 price	 index)	 and	 then	 the	 policy	 tool	 variables	 are	 added	 (fiscal	 balance,	 real	 effective	
exchange	 rate	 and	 money	 stock).	 This	 order	 assumes	 that	 politicians	 first	 observe	 their	
macroeconomic	 variables	 and	 then	 apply	 different	 policy	 tools17.	 Fiscal	 policy	 appears	 first	
																																								 																				
16		Boiciuc	(2014)	uses	48	observations	and	Ćorić,	T.,	Šimović,	H.,	&	Deskar-Škrbić,	M.	(2013)	use	52	observations.	
17	The	order	is	the	same	one	used	in	Christiano	et	al.	(1999).	Changes	in	the	order	of	the	variables	do	not	qualitatively	
alter	the	result	of	the	regression,	see	Appendix	2.	
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because	 it	was	 determined	 independently	 of	 the	 other	 available	 policies18.	 Then	 comes	 the	
exchange	 rate,	 which	 being	 flexible	 could	 act	 freely	 as	 a	 cushion	 or	 shock	 absorber	 for	 the	
economy,	and	monetary	policy	comes	last19.		
The	structural	model	is	as	follows:	 𝐴 𝐿 𝑋" = 𝑎, + 𝑢"	
where	𝑏,	is	the	vector	of	the	constant,	𝐴 𝐿 = 𝐼 − 𝐴1𝐿 − ⋯− 𝐴3𝐿3	is	a	p-th	order	lag	of	matrix	𝐴5	 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑝 	and	 	 𝑢" = 𝑢9", 𝑢3", 𝑢:", 𝑢;", 𝑢<"	 	 is	 the	 a	 five-by-one	 vector	 of	 serially	
uncorrelated	structural	disturbances	with	a	mean	zero	and	a	covariance	matrix	ΣC.	
Five	macroeconomic	variables	have	been	used.	The	𝑦"	is	real	pc	GDP	measured	using	GDP	from	
Prados	(2003)	and	population	from	Nicolau	(2005),	𝑝"	is	the	price	index	from	Maluquer	(2013),	𝑓"	is	the	real	fiscal	balance	as	percentage	of	GDP	obtained	by	Comín	and	Díaz	(2005),	𝑒"	is	the	
real	effective	exchange	rate,	whose	calculation	is	explained	below,	and	𝑚"	is	the	money	stock	
measured	through	M1	(Martín	Aceña	and	Pons,	2005)20.	All	the	data	have	been	calculated	in	
real	terms,	deflating	with	the	price	index	provided	by	Maluquer	(2013)21.		
The	 real	 effective	 exchange	 rate	 takes	 account	 of	 the	 average	weight	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	
against	the	pound	sterling,	the	French	franc	and	the	US	dollar.	The	calculation	of	the	exchange	
rate	makes	use	of	the	whosale	price	index	obtained	by	Sardà	(1948),	pp.	302-305,	for	Spain,	the	
whosale	price	index	obtained	by	Mitchell	(2007)	for	the	other	three	countries,	and	the	peseta	
exchange	rate	from	Martín	Aceña	and	Pons	(2005).	The	weight	of	foreign	trade	to	the	respective	
countries	is	obtained	from	Prados	de	la	Escosura	(1982),	p.	42,	using	fixed	weightings	updated	
every	five	years.	The	weightings	account	for	more	than	60%	of	total	foreign	trade	over	the	entire	
period.			
The	frequency	of	the	data	is	annual.	The	sample	runs	from	1874,	the	year	in	which	the	Banco	de	
España	 was	 granted	 a	 monopoly	 in	 the	 issue	 of	 banknotes	 because	 of	 the	 state’s	 treasury	
																																								 																				
18	The	problems	of	Spain’s	treasury,	which	were	the	result	of	the	many	wars	in	which	the	country	was	involved	in	the	
period,	meant	the	remaining	policies	were	determined	by	state	spending	(Escario,	Gadea	and	Sabaté,	2006)	
19	In	this	analysis,	it	is	not	possible	to	use	expected	inflation	(as	used	in	Shibamoto	and	Shizume,	2014)	because	of	the	
absence	of	futures	markets	in	Spain	in	the	cited	period.	Instead	of	six	variables,	therefore,	the	above	SVAR	model	has	
only	five.	
20	I	have	choosen	pc	GDP	because	it	is	a	better	measure	of	economic	growth	since	it	takes	into	account	the	population.	
Appendix	1	shows	autocorrelation	tests	and	normality	test.	The	results	would	not	vary	qualitatively	if	M2	were	used	
in	place	of	M1	or	if	the	nominal	exchange	rate	replaced	the	real	exchange	rate.	Nor	are	there	significant	variations	if	
total	GDP	is	used	 instead	of	pc	GDP.	For	more	 information,	see	Appendix	2.	Nor	do	the	conclusions	change	 if	the	
entire	analysis	is	done	in	nominal	terms.				
21	The	price	index	of	Maluquer	(2013,	pp.	59-60)	is	used	because	its	construction	makes	it	most	appropriate	for	the	
analysis	of	a	relatively	short	period	of	time.	CPIs	show	less	intense	highs	and	lows	than	wholesale	prices.	Differences	
between	the	two	estimations	appear	primarily	in	the	short	run.	In	the	long	run,	they	are	consistent	and	plausible.	
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hardships,	to	191322.	All	the	variables	have	been	converted	into	logarithms	with	the	exception	
of	the	fiscal	balance23.	The	available	criteria	for	selecting	the	number	of	VAR	lags	point	to	one	
lag	as	the	optimal	number	to	carry	out	the	SVAR	estimation.	The	SVAR	is	estimated	on	levels	
because	the	performance	of	the	estimation	is	consistent	even	if	each	variable	is	not	stationary	
(Hamilton,	1994,	pp.	651-653)24.		
The	paper	uses	the	Cholesky	decomposition	to	orthogonalise	the	reduced	form	innovations.	The	
Cholesky	decomposition	imposes	a	specific	form	of	structural	model	(the	first	variable	by	order	
is	considered	the	most	exogenous).	
III.	Empirical	results	
Structural	shocks	
	
This	section	sets	out	the	results	obtained	using	the	SVAR	estimation.	Three	different	results	are	
offered:	 	 the	 structural	 shocks	 of	 the	 times	 series,	 the	 impulse	 response	 function,	 and	 the	
historical	decomposition	of	the	macroeconomic	variables.			
	
																																								 																				
22	It	is	not	possible	to	start	the	analysis	earlier	because	of	the	lack	of	historical	series	of	monetary	circulation	prior	to	
1874.	
23	This	is	the	same	procedure	followed	by	Shibamoto	and	Shizume	(2014).	Because	the	fiscal	balance	has	negative	
values,	it	cannot	be	converted	into	logarithms.	As	a	result,	the	variable	is	used	without	conversion.	
24	A	Johansen	test	has	been	used	to	check	for	the	existence	of	a	cointegration	vector	for	the	variables	that	are	not	
stationary,	integrated	of	order	1.	See	Appendix	1.	
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Figure	2.	Structural	shocks		
Figure	2	 shows	 the	 structural	 shocks	 in	 the	 five	 time	 series.	Because	of	 the	method	of	 their	
construction,	the	structural	shocks	are	not	correlated.	The	following	events	must	be	taken	into	
account:	the	Banco	de	España	is	granted	a	monopoly	on	the	issue	of	banknotes	(1874),	the	Lyon	
stock	market	crisis	occurs	(1882),	the	peseta’s	convertibility	into	gold	is	suspended	(1883),	the	
Baring	crisis	and	the	Méline	tariff25	occur	(1891),	 the	phylloxera	outbreak	spreads	across	the	
Iberian	Peninsula	in	the	eighteen-nineties,	the	armed	conflict	against	the	US	comes	to	an	end	
(1898)	and	the	conflict	with	Morocco	begins	(1909).	The	shocks	obtained	from	the	VAR	analysis	
																																								 																				
25	The	tariff	was	a	major	tightening	of	the	entry	conditions	for	Spanish	wine,	which	was	the	country’s	leading	export,	
when	coming	into	France	(Serrano,	2011).	
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are	independent	of	the	structural	shocks	on	other	variables.	For	example,	the	structural	shocks	
in	fiscal	policy	are	not	induced	as	responses	to	fluctuations	in	the	other	variables.				
The	shocks	shown	in	Figure	2	are	consistent	with	the	historical	evidence.	The	first	graph	shows	
the	different	falls	in	GDP	that	correspond	to	distinct	economic	impacts.	First,	a	recovery	in	GDP	
can	be	observed.	This	can	be	associated	with	the	euphoria	of	the	Bourbon	Restoration.	Later,	
between	1878	and	1879,	there	is	a	negative,	but	short	impact26.		
From	 1882,	 GDP	 again	 began	 to	 fall.	 In	 that	 same	 year,	 the	Banque	 de	 Lyon	 et	 de	 la	 Loira	
collapsed	and	the	shockwaves	spread	first	to	Paris	and	later	to	Spain.	After	the	fall	of	financial	
institutions	 in	 Lyon,	 the	 Spanish	 banks	 experienced	 cash	 withdrawals,	 bank	 failures	 and	
dwindling	gold	reserves.	 In	addition,	the	possibility	of	 importing	cheap	grain	sparked	a	major	
agricultural	 depression	 that	 compounded	 the	 financial	 slump	 and	 turned	 the	 crisis	 into	 the	
longest	of	the	period.	Large	outflows	of	gold	from	Spain	precluded	the	conversion	of	Spanish	
banknotes	into	gold	(Sardà,	1987,	p.	179;	Martín	Aceña,	1993,	pp.	135,	137	and	189;	Tortella,	
1994,	pp.	139,	177	and	480-481;	Bordo	and	Schwartz,	1999,	p.	32;	Martín	Aceña,	Nogués	and	
Martínez	Ruíz,	2011,	p.	3	and	Catalan	and	Sánchez,	2012,	p.	96).	From	this	time,	a	negative	trend	
continued	until	1889,	when	GDP	began	to	recover.			
In	1892,	with	the	previous	crisis	still	not	entirely	overcome,	a	new	international	financial	crisis	
escalated,	 turning	 particularly	 severe	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 The	 solvency	 problems	 of	 the	
Banco	Nacional	de	Buenos	Aires	had	forced	Argentina	to	suspend	payments	and	pushed	Barings	
Brothers	to	the	brink	of	ruin	by	1890.	Initially,	GDP	appeared	to	recover	modestly,	but	it	again	
fell	between	1895	and	1897.	This	was	an	economic	crisis	of	great	breadth	(Sardà,	1987,	p.	223).	
In	addition,	the	Méline	tariff	levied	by	the	French	made	the	entry	conditions	insurmountable	for	
alcoholic	beverages	from	the	Iberian	Peninsula,	preventing	wine	exports	(Serrano,	2011,	p.	641).	
The	loss	of	the	French	market	intensified	the	slump	and	the	outbreak	of	phylloxera	throughout	
the	Iberian	Peninsula	further	exacerbated	the	situation.			
Between	1902	and	1906,	another	period	of	crisis	 took	hold.	At	 this	 time,	GDP	 fell	 twice	as	a	
consequence	of	swingeing	budget	adjustments	and	the	Melilla	War.	Lastly,	the	years	1910	and	
1912	point	to	two	slight	declines	in	GDP	coinciding	with	the	conflict	with	Morocco.		
The	price	shocks	followed	an	upward	trend,	with	fluctuations,	until	1883,	just	after	the	financial	
bubble	burst	in	Lyon.	Then	prices	fell	until	a	recovery	began	in	1885.	At	that	point,	they	trended	
upwards,	but	continued	to	fluctuate	until	1892.	Even	so,	Spanish	prices	remained	higher	than	
																																								 																				
26	Vicens	and	Nadal	(1967)	reproduced	in	Vicens	and	Nadal	(1987),	p.	674.	
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the	 prices	 in	 the	 remaining	Western	 countries,	 thereby	 avoiding	 the	 deflation	 abroad.	 From	
1893,	prices	followed	a	slightly	negative	overall	trend.	In	1904,	a	sharp	fall	occurred,	probably	
as	a	result	of	Villaverde’s	restrictive	policies	to	balance	the	Spanish	budget	and	halt	monetary	
expansion	by	means	of	domestic	devaluation27.		
In	 the	 late	eighteen-seventies,	 shocks	 in	 the	 fiscal	balance	 showed	a	downward	 trend.	 From	
1882,	the	fiscal	balance	improved	because	of	the	debt	reorganisation	carried	out	by	Camacho28.	
The	 structural	 shocks	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 suffered	 a	 negative	 impact	 between	 1884	 and	 1889	
coinciding	with	falls	in	GDP.	The	war	against	the	US	pushed	public	spending	higher	and	boosted	
aggregate	demand.	As	a	result,	there	was	a	very	intense	negative	impact	on	the	budget	between	
1894	and	1898.	 In	1900,	stability	was	regained,	but	then	another	downward	trend	took	hold	
until	 1903.	 The	moments	 of	 greatest	 public	 spending	 correspond	 to	 armed	 conflicts.	 As	 an	
outgrowth	of	Villaverde’s	restrictive	policies,	the	fiscal	balance	remained	balanced	and	in	surplus	
with	the	sole	exception	of	1909,	the	year	in	which	the	armed	conflict	against	Morocco	began.	In	
that	year,	a	negative	impact	can	be	observed.	
The	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuated	mildly	 into	 the	 eighteen-eighties.	 From	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	
decade,	however,	there	were	more	severe	impacts	on	the	value	of	the	currency.	Going	forward,	
the	peseta	tended	to	depreciate	until	1898.	In	1887-1890,	a	depreciation	helped	to	overcome	
the	 crisis	 mentioned	 above	 (Sardà,	 1987).	 Later,	 in	 1892,	 a	 small	 rise	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	
(depreciation)	can	be	seen.	Similarly,	between	1893	and	1894,	the	peseta	lost	value.		Then,	in	
response	to	the	debacle	in	Cuba,	the	currency	entered	a	very	intense	process	of	depreciation,	
particularly	in	1896-1897,	reaching	its	historical	high	mark	in	1898.	This	loss	of	value	contributed	
to	 overcoming	 the	 economic	 crisis	 that	 hit	 Spain	 in	 the	 eighteen-nineties	 (Maluquer,	 1999).	
Subsequently,	the	exchange	rate	appreciated	as	a	result	of	Villaverde’s	contractionary	policies.	
In	1910,	the	value	of	the	currency	fell	as	a	consequence	of	the	conflict	with	Morocco.		
The	money	stock	rose	sharply	in	1878	and	then	again	in	1880.	Later,	during	the	crisis	of	the	Lyon	
stock	exchange,	the	money	stock	was	further	increased.	In	1895,	another	sharp	rise	took	place.	
In	1898,	a	major	shock	in	the	money	stock	coincided	with	a	sharp	depreciation	of	the	national	
currency	as	highlighted	 in	the	previous	paragraph	and	the	war	against	the	US.	Subsequently,	
																																								 																				
27	The	projects	of	Villaverde	that	were	carried	out	in	this	period	were	based	on	a	simple	version	of	the	
quantity	theory	of	money	without	taking	into	consideration	the	negative	effects	of	sudden	deflation	on	
finances	or	industry	(Olariaga,	1933,	pp.	108-112	and	Maluquer,	1999,	pp.	184-185).	
28	 In	1879,	Spain’s	public	debt	 represented	over	200%	of	GDP.	Spain	was	 in	need	of	a	 reformer.	 Juan	
Francisco	Camacho	de	Alcorta	arrived	at	the	Ministry	of	Finance	in	1881.	There	he	enacted	a	reform	in	
December	1881	to	extricate	the	nation	from	insolvency.	Debt	was	reorganized,	government	bonds	were	
consolidated	and	financial	burdens	were	reduced.	This	was	a	voluntary,	mutually	agreed	restructuring	
(Comín	and	Martorell,	2006).	
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greater	stability	in	the	money	stock	coincided	with	Villaverde’s	policies	and	an	improved	balance	
in	the	state’s	accounts.	Lastly,	in	1909,	an	increase	in	the	money	stock	took	place,	possibly	as	a	
funding	measure	for	the	war	against	Morocco.		
Effects	of	the	structural	shocks	
	
A	 shock	 to	 the	 i-th	 variable	 not	 only	 affects	 the	 i-th	 variable	 directly,	 but	 also	 all	 the	 other	
endogenous	 variables	 by	means	 of	 the	VAR’s	 dynamic	 structure	 (lag).	 The	 impulse	 response	
function	traces	the	effect	of	one	standard	deviation	shock	on	the	current	and	future	values	of	
the	endogenous	variables,	causing	them	to	increase	or	decrease29.	
	
Figure	3.	Impulse	response	function	
	
Figure	 3	 sets	 out	 the	 impulse	 response	 functions	 for	 each	 variable.	 The	 rows	 show	 each	
variable’s	response	to	five	different	shocks.	The	columns	show	the	response	of	all	the	variables	
to	one	type	of	shock.	For	instance,	the	first	row	shows	the	responses	of	GDP	to	shocks	on	each	
variable,	while	the	first	column	shows	how	shocks	on	output	affect	each	variable.	The	red	bands	
																																								 																				
29	A	shock	is	considered	a	positive	impact.	
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show	 a	 standard	 deviation	 of	 1.96	 with	 a	 confidence	 interval	 of	 90%30.	 The	main	 aim	 is	 to	
observe	whether	monetary	policy,	fiscal	policy	or	a	flexible	exchange	rate	had	an	impact	on	the	
real	 economy	 and	whether	 this	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Spanish	 economy.	 Did	 a	
flexible	exchange	rate,	increases	in	the	money	supply	and	recurring	deficits	help	to	overcome	
the	fluctuations	of	the	economic	cycle?		
According	to	the	impulse	response	functions,	expansionary	fiscal	policy	had	a	positive	impact	on	
GDP.	Both	monetary	policy	and	the	exchange	rate	also	affected	GDP	positively.	With	an	increase	
in	M1	or	 the	exchange	 rate	 (depreciation),	GDP	 rose31.	 In	 short,	expansionary	monetary	and	
fiscal	 policy	 and	 the	 depreciation	 of	 the	 peseta	were	 useful	macroeconomic	 policy	 tools	 for	
Spain’s	economy	during	the	classical	gold	standard.			
The	fourth	column	shows	the	responses	to	shocks	on	the	exchange	rate.	In	the	top	chart,	GDP	
increased	after	a	shock	on	the	exchange	rate	(depreciation).	Prices	also	responded	positively	to	
a	shock	on	the	exchange	rate.	The	results	suggest	that	shocks	to	the	value	of	the	currency	had	a	
major	influence	on	the	real	economy	during	the	period	of	the	classical	gold	standard.	A	shock	
on	 the	exchange	rate	also	had	a	positive	 impact	on	 the	exchange	rate	 itself.	 In	addition,	 the	
currency’s	loss	of	value	was	followed	by	an	increase	in	the	money	stock.	Depreciation	produced	
an	 excess	 of	 demand	 for	 money.	 To	 compensate,	 the	 money	 supply	 had	 to	 increase,	 thus	
increasing	the	price	level.	Similarly,	there	was	a	positive	trend	in	the	fiscal	balance	in	response	
to	a	depreciation	of	the	exchange	rate.	In	the	face	of	a	shock	on	the	exchange	rate,	the	state’s	
accounts	improved.	Lastly,	given	the	positive	impact	of	depreciations	on	GDP,	the	exchange	rate	
can	be	said	to	have	acted	as	an	automatic	stabiliser	of	the	economy32.	
The	fifth	column	represents	the	impulse	response	functions	to	a	monetary	shock	(an	increase	in	
the	amount	of	money).	An	increase	of	money	supply	had	a	positive	impact	on	output.	This	was	
followed	 by	 a	 fall	 in	 interest	 rate,	which	 augmented	 exchange	 rate	 (depreciation).	 Hence,	 a	
shock	on	the	money	stock	was	followed	by	a	depreciation	of	the	peseta.	The	creation	of	liquidity	
by	 the	 monetary	 authorities	 caused	 the	 value	 of	 the	 peseta	 to	 fall.	 The	 impulse	 response	
function	 confirms	 that	 a	 shock	 on	 the	 money	 stock	 brought	 about	 a	 statistically	 significant	
increase	in	real	GDP	and	prices.	Thus,	an	expansionary	monetary	policy	had	effects	on	the	real	
economy	through	the	stimulation	of	aggregate	demand.		
																																								 																				
30	Standard	deviations	are	preferred	because	they	offer	the	responses	in	the	correct	order	of	magnitude.	
31	Peripheral	countries	used	depreciation	 in	order	 to	overcome	crises	 recurrently.	Matthias	Morys	 (2013),	p.	221,	
shows	that	these	countries	paid	little	attention	to	variations	in	the	exchange	rate	and	a	great	deal	of	attention	to	the	
bank	coverage	ratio.	
32	If	M2	is	used,	it	also	shows	a	positive	effect,	but	the	error	bands	are	wider.	
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As	can	be	observed	in	the	third	column,	shocks	on	fiscal	policy	also	had	an	impact	on	the	real	
economy.	If	the	symmetry	of	the	functions	is	taken	into	account,	a	negative	shock	on	the	fiscal	
balance	 initially	 caused	an	 increase	 in	GDP.	The	 increase	 in	public	 spending	ultimately	had	a	
multiplier	 effect	 that	 led	 to	 a	 rise	 in	 GDP.	 By	 contrast,	 budgetary	 tightening	 produced	 an	
economic	contraction.	The	application	of	expansionary	 fiscal	policy,	 therefore,	had	a	positive	
impact	on	Spain’s	real	economy.	In	turn,	an	increase	in	deficits	caused	an	increase	in	the	money	
supply,	providing	evidence	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	policies33.	
GDP	shocks	had	significant	effects	on	real	GDP,	but	limited	effects	on	prices.	In	this	period	an	
increase	of	GDP	was	followed	by	currency	depreciation.	The	money	stock	rose	when	GDP	rose.	
Higher	GDP	spurred	increased	demand	for	money	to	be	used	in	transactions,	so	an	increase	in	
the	money	stock	became	necessary.	A	rise	in	money	supply	also	caused	an	increase	in	exchange	
rate	(depreciation)	until	price	level	was	high	enough	to	equal	supply	and	demand.	
Price	shocks	had	a	positive	impact	on	GDP	and	on	prices	themselves.	However,	their	effect	on	
the	exchange	rate	was	virtually	negligible.	A	shock	on	domestic	prices	caused	an	increase	in	the	
fiscal	 balance.	 In	 addition,	 an	 increase	 in	 prices	 generated	 a	 rise	 in	 the	money	 stock.	 Being	
outside	the	gold	standard	maintained	freedom	of	action	in	monetary,	fiscal	and	exchange	rate	
policy	and	this	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	Spanish	economy.	
	
Historical	decomposition	of	the	variables	
	
In	 this	 section,	 an	 historical	 decomposition	 analysis	 shows	 how	 the	 model	 describes	 and	
interprets	history.	The	historical	decompositions	measure	the	cumulative	contribution	of	each	
structural	shock	on	the	evolution	of	each	variable	over	time.	They	are	essential,	for	instance,	to	
understand	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 declines	 or	 increases	 of	 a	 given	 variable.	 The	 figures	 show	 the	
decompositions	for	the	fluctuations	in	each	variable	that	can	be	explained	by	the	five	structural	
shocks	in	the	model.		
	
																																								 																				
33	This	relationship	is	addressed	in	detail	in	section	5.		
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Figure	4.	Historical	decomposition	of	GDP	
Figure	4	decomposes	the	series	of	real	GDP	into	five	components	that	are	explained	by	the	five	
types	of	structural	shocks,	respectively:	GDP,	prices,	fiscal	balance,	exchange	rate	and	money	
stock.	It	explains	the	contributions	of	shocks	on	the	different	variables	to	fluctuations	in	GDP.	
The	continuous	line	shows	the	fluctuations	in	GDP	and	the	broken	line	shows	the	decomposition	
into	 the	 different	 structural	 shocks.	 The	 shocks	 on	 GDP	 account	 for	 the	 largest	 part	 of	 the	
fluctuations	 in	 output	 between	 1874	 and	 1884.	 By	 contrast,	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	
eighteen-eighties,	the	nineties	and	the	early	years	of	the	twentieth	century,	a	portion	of	these	
fluctuations	was	due	to	other	factors.			
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The	real	exchange	rate	affected	movements	in	GDP,	especially	the	upward	trend	from	1896	to	
1906.	Between	1897	and	1899,	the	value	of	the	currency	stimulated	the	recovery	of	real	GDP.	
Indeed,	 the	peseta’s	greatest	 loss	of	value	occurred	 in	1898.	Nonetheless,	 the	exchange	rate	
promoted	the	recovery	of	the	Spanish	economy	and	it	helped	to	explain	the	fluctuations	in	real	
GDP.	Changes	in	the	amount	of	money	also	explain,	though	to	a	lesser	extent	than	the	exchange	
rate,	 the	declines	and	 increases	 in	GDP,	especially	 in	the	periods	1890	and	1906.	The	money	
stock	helps	to	explain	the	negative	trend	and	especially	the	recovery	of	GDP	from	1897	to	1900.	
The	impacts	of	prices	had	a	very	limited	effect	during	most	of	the	overall	period.	Fiscal	shocks	
had	practically	no	effect	on	fluctuations	in	real	GDP.		
In	 line	 with	 this	 analysis,	 politicians	 formulated	 some	 of	 their	 policies	 in	 response	 to	 the	
country’s	economic	conditions	and	to	changes	in	other	policies.	To	analyse	this,	Figures	5,	6	and	
7	 have	 been	 constructed	 to	 show	 each	 historical	 decomposition	 of	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 fiscal	
balance,	the	exchange	rate	and	the	money	stock	and	the	components	attributed	to	structural	
shocks	(GDP,	prices,	fiscal	balance,	exchange	rate	and	money	stock)	into	which	each	of	them	is	
decomposed.	
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Figure	5.	Historical	decomposition	of	the	fiscal	balance		
Figure	5	shows	the	historical	decomposition	of	fluctuations	in	the	fiscal	balance.	Shocks	due	to	
fiscal	policy	explain	most	of	the	movements	in	the	fiscal	balance	over	the	entirety	of	the	period.	
However,	occasional	 variations	can	be	observed.	 In	 the	period	1885-1905,	 the	variations	are	
largely	explained	by	shocks	in	the	exchange	rate.	In	the	period	1890-1906,	shocks	in	the	money	
stock	have	 influence	on	movements	 in	 the	 fiscal	 balance.	 Level	 of	 prices,	 though	 to	 a	 lesser	
extent	than	the	exchange	rate	and	money	stock,	also	explained	fluctuations	in	the	fiscal	policy.	
Shocks	due	to	GDP	do	not	help	to	explain	the	fluctuations	in	fiscal	policy	throughout	the	period.		
Figure	6	shows	the	historical	decomposition	of	fluctuations	in	the	exchange	rate.	Shocks	to	the	
exchange	rate	explained	major	part	of	movements	in	the	exchange	rate.	Shocks	to	the	money	
stock	and	GDP	are	the	shocks	that	to	the	largest	extent	explain	movements	in	the	value	of	the	
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currency.	Real	GDP	influenced	fluctuations	in	the	exchange	rate,	particularly	between	1875	and	
1890.	Thus,	the	exchange	rate	responded	to	the	state	of	the	Spanish	economy	by	acting	as	an	
automatic	stabiliser	of	the	economy.	Fiscal	policy	contributed	to	the	evolution	of	the	exchange	
rate	between	1883	and	1890.	The	exchange	rate	policy	was	endogenous.	
	
Figure	6.	Historical	decomposition	of	the	exchange	rate	
Figure	7	represents	the	historical	decomposition	of	the	money	stock.	Monetary	shocks	explained	
a	large	part	of	the	fluctuations	in	the	money	stock.	Shocks	to	the	fiscal	balance	and	the	exchange	
rate	had	an	effect	on	fluctuations	in	the	money	stock	over	the	entire	period.	Shocks	to	GDP	also	
helped	 to	 explain	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 money	 stock,	 particularly	 between	 1881	 and	 1890,	
coinciding	with	 a	 fall	 in	 GDP.	Monetary	 policy	 responded	 to	 the	 economic	 cycle	 and	 it	 was	
endogenous.	
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Figure	7.	Historical	decomposition	of	the	money	stock	
Both	the	exchange	rate	and	monetary	policy	responded	to	the	current	state	of	GDP.	The	results	
show	how	the	policies	were	not	exogenous,	but	endogenous.	That	 is,	 some	policies	affected	
other	policies	and	they	varied	as	a	function	of	the	economic	conditions	and	the	policies	applied.	
It	can	be	confirmed	that	the	increase	in	money	in	circulation	and	the	depreciation	of	the	peseta	
had	positive	effects	on	the	real	economy	during	the	classical	gold	standard	in	a	Spain	that	was	
outside	the	international	monetary	system.	Within	the	gold	standard,	there	would	have	been	
no	option	to	depreciate	the	currency	and	the	difficulties	of	maintaining	a	fixed	exchange	rate	
would	have	grown.	Staying	in	the	gold	standard	would	have	led	to	internal	devaluations	through	
prices	and	wages.	These	kinds	of	policies	 in	undiversified	economies	 like	Spain’s	would	have	
inhibited	recovery	at	times	of	fluctuation	in	the	economic	cycle.	The	Spanish	economy	made	use	
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of	 the	exchange	rate	and	monetary	expansion	to	overcome	such	economic	 impacts.	Without	
these	policy	tools,	the	adjustments	would	have	been	much	more	prolonged	and	painful.				
IV.	Benefits	of	being	outside	the	gold	standard		
	
In	the	period	under	study,	the	maintenance	of	the	gold	standard	was	an	essential	requirement	
for	prosperity.	This	 led	to	the	use	of	restrictive	policies	when	the	need	was	for	expansionary	
ones	(Temin,	1995).	When	fluctuations	in	the	cycle	are	intense	and	unexpected,	a	rapid	reaction	
is	 necessary	 to	 preserve	 equilibrium.	 The	 classical	 gold	 standard	 did	 not	 permit	 this	 type	 of	
response	and	it	undercut	a	country’s	options	to	control	its	own	economy	through	the	setting	of	
exchange	rates	(Keynes,	1932/1988,	pp.	173	and	180)34.	 It	was	a	system,	therefore,	that	was	
hard	to	apply	 in	countries	on	the	southern	periphery	of	Europe	 like	Spain.	Floating	exchange	
rates	were	and	are	a	fast	way	to	correct	for	shocks	that	affect	the	equilibrium	between	domestic	
price	levels	and	price	levels	abroad35.	The	main	cause	of	internal	instability	experienced	up	to	
1914	with	the	classical	gold	standard	was	a	result	of	the	subordination	of	economic	policy	to	
external	objectives.		
Policies	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 early	 twentieth	 century	 were	 not	 devised	
strategically,	but	rather	were	adjusted	in	accordance	with	circumstances36.	None	of	these	policy	
options	could	have	been	pursued	under	the	gold	standard,	which	required	restrictive	policies	to	
be	maintained	over	time.	Without	the	freedom	to	choose	macroeconomic	policy	and	a	flexible	
exchange	rate,	the	impact	of	fluctuations	in	the	economic	cycle	would	have	been	much	greater.	
Based	on	the	results,	the	depreciation	of	the	peseta	was	crucial	to	increasing	output	and	prices	
during	the	various	crises	that	hit	the	Spanish	economy	in	the	period	under	study37.	
Over	the	period,	monetary	policy	played	a	fundamental	role	as	a	consequence	of	Spain	being	
outside	 the	 gold	 standard.	 According	 to	 Sardà	 (1987,	 218),	 the	 fiduciary	 expansion	 brought	
about	 by	 pressure	 from	 the	 Spanish	 treasury	 was	 able	 to	 sustain	 the	 country’s	 economic	
progress.	In	the	short	term,	monetary	policy	was	one	of	the	most	powerful	tools	to	change	the	
real	 economy.	 As	 the	 impulse	 response	 function	 and	 the	 historical	 decomposition	 of	 the	
																																								 																				
34	Keynes	(1932)	reproduced	in	Keynes	(1988).	
35	“The	classical	gold	standard	is	not	appropriate	in	practice	to	overcome	[such	difficulties],	simply	because	it	cannot	
produce	a	readjustment	of	domestic	prices	quickly	enough”	(Keynes,	1932/1988,	p.	180).	
36	Olariaga,	1977,	p.	137,	takes	the	view	that	Spain’s	policy	was	ad	hoc	rather	than	a	control	aimed	consciously	at	
regulating	the	economic	cycle.	
37	For	literature	on	the	Spanish	case,	see	Olariaga,	(1933),	Tortella	(1974),	Sardà	(1987),	Martín	Aceña	(1981,	1993,	
1997,	2000),	Catalan,	Sudrià	and	Tirado	(2001)	and	Catalan	and	Sánchez	(2012).	For	other	cases,	see	Temin	(1995),	
Bernanke	 (1995),	 Eichengreen	 and	 Temin	 (2010),	 Bordo	 and	 Rockoff	 (1996),	 Shibamoto	 and	 Shizume	 (2014),	
Eichengreen	and	Sachs	(1986).	
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variables	show,	this	policy	accommodated	the	state’s	fiscal	needs	(Escario,	Gadea	and	Sabaté,	
2011,	pp.	271-272	and	Sabaté,	Gadea	and	Escario,	2006,	pp.	310,	321	and	328).	These	scholars	
stress	 that	 seigniorage	 was	 essential	 to	 safeguarding	 the	 state’s	 long-term	 solvency38.	 The	
Spanish	 treasury	was	 in	need	of	money,	which	 it	obtained	by	monetising	public	debt	 (Sardà,	
1987,	 pp.	 186,	 190	 and	 199).	 The	 impossibility	 of	 using	 monetary	 policy	 because	 of	 a	
commitment	to	the	gold	standard	would	have	ruled	out	action	to	counter	the	economic	impacts	
(Bordo,	Choudri	and	Schwartz,	2002,	p.	2).	In	the	Spanish	case,	the	application	of	expansionary	
economic	 policies	 prevented	 more	 intense	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 economic	 cycle	 and	 avoided	
external	deflation39.	
Figure	8.	Growth	rates	for	the	components	of	GDP,	1893-1899.	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	Prados	de	la	Escosura	(2003).	
	
As	the	impulse	response	functions	show,	deficits	made	it	possible	to	avoid	the	further	stifling	of	
an	economy	that	was	already	sluggish.	Between	1883	and	1892,	the	deficits	were	constant	and	
the	needs	of	the	Spanish	treasury	meant	that	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	were	dependent	on	one	
another	 (see	 impulse	 response	 function).	 Lastly,	 there	was	 no	 application	 of	 fiscal	 austerity	
measures,	which	would	have	been	detrimental	to	the	Spanish	economy.		
In	the	specific	case	of	the	economic	crisis	at	the	end	of	the	eighteen-nineties,	the	statistics	on			
gross	 domestic	 product	 point	 to	 the	 great	 importance	 of	 exports	 in	 the	 economic	 recovery	
																																								 																				
38	They	stress	the	importance	of	preserving	monetary	sovereignty.	
39	Dornbursch	(1987).	The	coordination	of	monetary	policies	to	keep	a	stable	exchange	rate	would	be	unable	to	offset	
the	relinquishing	of	deficit	financing	through	the	issue	of	banknotes.		
C	 G	 I	 V	E	 X	 M	 GDP	 Year	
-9.07%	 -0.88%	 -0.62%	 0.08%	 -1.98%	 1.04%	 -11.437%	 1893	
-0.61%	 -0.32%	 -0.08%	 0.11%	 0.24%	 -0.32%	 -0.984%	 1894	
-4.69%	 -0.15%	 0.17%	 0.12%	 -0.48%	 1.77%	 -3.259%	 1895	
-5.09%	 0.42%	 0.00%	 0.14%	 4.34%	 -1.93%	 -2.131%	 1896	
10.85%	 1.47%	 0.68%	 0.16%	 2.23%	 -1.61%	 13.776%	 1897	
8.33%	 0.79%	 0.42%	 0.10%	 -0.17%	 -0.02%	 9.459%	 1898	
2.31%	 -0.85%	 2.93%	 0.05%	 -2.28%	 -1.74%	 0.409%	 1899	
11.25%	 1.18%	 5.15%	 -26.68%	 9.07%	 -4.26%	 -4.278%	 1893-
1899	
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(Figure	8)40.	Spain’s	economy	shrank	by	4.28%	during	the	crisis	of	the	nineties.	Exports	helped	
to	bolster	GDP	by	9.1%,	while	consumer	spending	pushed	up	GDP	by	11.2%.	Investment,	ranked	
third	behind	exports	and	consumption,	contributed	5.15%	and	government	spending	aided	in	a	
1.2%	 growth	 in	 GDP.	 In	 the	 short	 run,	 thanks	 to	 a	 flexible	 exchange	 rate,	 Spain	was	 barely	
affected	by	the	cyclical	downturn	that	affected	the	international	economy	between	1890	and	
1896	(Sardà,	1987,	p.	197).	
The	results	obtained	by	Cha	(2003)	and	by	Shibamoto	and	Shizume	(2014)	vary	depending	on	
whether	or	not	the	dynamics	of	prices	are	included	in	the	SVAR	model.	For	this	reason,	the	same	
analysis	has	been	repeated	without	the	prices	variable	to	observe	whether	any	changes	occur.	
Leaving	out	prices,	the	results	do	not	vary	qualitatively.	The	money	stock	retains	its	importance	
as	the	variable	that	explains	GDP	fluctuations	to	the	greatest	extent.	Fiduciary	expansion	was	
the	key	factor	in	sustaining	the	economic	progress	of	the	country.	The	exchange	rate	retained	
its	importance	in	the	impulse	response	function	and	in	the	historical	decomposition	(Figure	9).	
Depreciation	had	a	greater	countercyclical	effect	in	the	crisis	of	the	eighteen-nineties	than	was	
shown	 by	 the	 SVAR	model	 including	 prices.	 Lastly,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 fiscal	 balance	 on	 GDP	
diminished	 in	 the	 impulse	 response	 function	 and	 remained	 a	 non-explanatory	 factor	 of	
fluctuations	in	GDP.			
	
	
																																								 																				
40	Only	the	crisis	of	the	late	eighteen-nineties	is	examined	because	it	was	the	longest	crisis	in	the	period.	The	study	
could	be	extended	to	the	entire	period.	
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Figure	9.	Original	model	vs.	VAR	model	without	the	prices	variable		
As	Spain	was	affected	by	recurring	armed	conflicts	in	the	period,	the	same	model	has	also	been	
estimated	with	the	addition	of	an	exogenous	dummy	variable	that	takes	a	value	of	1	for	years	in	
which	Spain	was	engaged	in	armed	conflict	and	0	for	years	in	which	it	was	not	(Figure	10)41.	The	
analysis	does	not	change	significantly.	The	impulse	response	function	shows	results			of	identical	
sign.	However,	the	response	of	GDP	to	fiscal	policy	was	greater	when	armed	conflicts	are	taken	
into	account.	On	the	one	hand,	the	response	of	Spain’s	economy	to	monetary	policy	diminished.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 output	 response	 to	 exchange	 rate	 increased.	 	 Anyway,	 both	 have	 a	
positive	impact.	The	historical	decomposition	of	output,	when	taking	wars	into	account,	shows	
a	slight	decreased	importance	of	shocks	on	fiscal	policy	in	the	explanation	of	GDP	fluctuations.	
Monetary	 shocks	 see	 a	 decrease	 in	 their	 power	 to	 explain	 GDP	 fluctuations,	 although	 they	
continue	to	be	important	to	an	understanding	of	the	ups	and	downs	of	the	Spanish	economy42.		
Finally,	exchange	rate	shocks	increased	their	capacity	of	explain	output	fluctuations,	concretely,	
between	1895	and	1900.	
	
																																								 																				
41	Spain	was	engaged	in	the	following	armed	conflicts:	Third	Carlist	War	(1872-1876),	Ten	Years’	War	(1868-1878),	
Little	War	(Cuba)	(1879-1880),	Cuban	War	of	Independence	(1895-1898),	Spanish-American	War	(1898),	Philippine	
Revolution	(1896-1898),	Margallo	War	(1893-1894),	Melilla	War	(1909-1913),	and	Rif	War,	or	Second	Moroccan	War	
(1911-1927).	
42	The	results	of	 the	 impulse	response	function	are	even	more	 in	keeping	with	economic	theory	than	the	original	
results	were.	
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Figure	10.	Original	model	vs.	VAR	model	with	“War”	dummy.	
Conclusion	
	
This	paper	has	presented	an	overall	picture	of	macroeconomic	policy	tools	and	their	effects	on	
Spain’s	economy	between	1874	and	1913.	The	Spanish	case	is	significant	because	it	was	the	only	
Western	 country	 not	 to	 enter	 the	 classical	 gold	 standard.	 The	 main	 finding	 is	 that	 the	
depreciation	of	the	exchange	rate	had	salient	effects	on	the	Spanish	economy	outside	the	gold	
standard	during	the	period	1874-1913.			
The	SVAR	analysis	reveals	that	adjustments	 in	exchange	rates	and	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	
undertaken	as	policy	tools	played	an	important	role	in	the	recoveries	that	followed	declines	in	
GDP.	 Expansionary	monetary	 policy	 needed	 to	 sustain	 state	 spending	helped	 to	 smooth	out	
fluctuations	 in	GDP.	While	this	policy	was	effective,	 it	was	not	carried	out	as	an	independent	
policy.	Rather,	it	was	a	response	to	economic	conditions.	Indeed,	it	can	be	confirmed	that	the	
policies	were	endogenous	and	depended	ultimately	on	fiscal	policy,	that	is,	on	the	needs	of	the	
Spanish	treasury.	The	effects	of	fiscal	policy	were	less	significant.	The	exchange	rate	level	was	
crucial	because	it	helped	to	improve	the	terms	of	trade,	promoted	exports	and	raised	prices	at	
a	 time	 when	 the	 Western	 world	 was	 suffering	 from	 the	 problems	 of	 deflation.	 The	 three	
variables	had	a	positive	effect	on	the	real	economy.	On	balance,	having	a	flexible	exchange	rate	
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and	an	expansionary	monetary	policy	was	crucial	to	sustaining	growth	amid	the	fluctuations	of	
the	economic	cycle.				
Some	 studies	 emphasise	 that	 Spain	 should	 have	 entered	 the	 monetary	 system	 of	 the	 gold	
standard	and	that	this	would	have	improved	its	economy	in	the	long	run	(Martín	Aceña,	1981,	
1993,	1997	and	2000;	Martínez-Ruíz	and	Nogues,	2014).	Nonetheless,	this	paper	shows	how	the	
policies	adopted	by	Spain	outside	the	gold	standard	had	a	positive	effect	on	its	economy.	Being	
inside	the	gold	standard	would	have	made	it	impossible	to	apply	economic	stimulus	measures.	
The	paper	confirms	the	hypothesis	of	Sardà	(1987),	pp.	169-196,	and	the	assertions	of	Martín	
Aceña	(1981),	p.	275	and	(1993),	pp.	145	and	154;	Tortella	 (1994),	pp.	177-178;	Herranz	and	
Tirado	(1996),	p.	32;	Serrano	(2004),	p.	164	and	Catalan	and	Sánchez	(2012),	pp.	110-111.	
In	 the	 face	 of	 dramatic	 economic	 shocks,	 the	 rigidities	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 inhibited	
recovery,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery.	 The	 results	 in	 this	 paper	 provide	 new	
empirical	 evidence	 for	 the	 core-periphery	 debate	 addressing	 the	period	of	 the	 classical	 gold	
standard.	
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Annex	1	
I. Unit	root	test	
 
Null Hypothesis: LYPC has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.067000  0.7173  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407   
 5% level  -2.951125   
 10% level  -2.614300   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
      
 
Null Hypothesis: LP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.871934  0.3416  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.610453   
 5% level  -2.938987   
 10% level  -2.607932   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: F has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.804435  0.3726  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.621023   
 5% level  -2.943427   
 10% level  -2.610263   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LE3 has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.554924  0.1109  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.610453   
 5% level  -2.938987   
 10% level  -2.607932   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LM1 has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.970472  0.7529  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.632900   
 5% level  -2.948404   
 10% level  -2.612874   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
	
II. Cointegration	test	
 
Sample (adjusted): 1876 1913    
Included observations: 38 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)  
Series: LYPC LPM F2 LE3 LM1     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.634790  103.1567  76.97277  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.592181  64.87992  54.07904  0.0041  
At most 2  0.367951  30.79652  35.19275  0.1381  
At most 3  0.238931  13.36257  20.26184  0.3356  
At most 4  0.075605  2.987392  9.164546  0.5830  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.634790  38.27678  34.80587  0.0185  
At most 1 *  0.592181  34.08340  28.58808  0.0089  
At most 2  0.367951  17.43395  22.29962  0.2083  
At most 3  0.238931  10.37518  15.89210  0.3014  
At most 4  0.075605  2.987392  9.164546  0.5830  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
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III. Lag	lenght	criteria	
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria      
Endogenous variables: LYPC LPM F2 LE3 LM1      
Exogenous variables: C       
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:24      
Sample: 1874 1913       
Included observations: 37      
        
         Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ  
        
        0  323.6573 NA   2.28e-14 -17.22472 -17.00703 -17.14797  
1  431.6676  180.9903  2.60e-16 -21.71176  -20.40561*  -21.25128*  
2  462.5042   43.33790*   2.05e-16*  -22.02725* -19.63265 -21.18304  
3  486.8008  27.57996  2.63e-16 -21.98923 -18.50617 -20.76129  
        
         * indicates lag order selected by the criterion     
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)    
 FPE: Final prediction error      
 AIC: Akaike information criterion      
 SC: Schwarz information criterion      
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion     
        
        
	
IV. Autocorrelation	test	
 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h  
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:25  
Sample: 1874 1913   
Included observations: 39  
    
    Lags LM-Stat Prob  
    
    1  40.88144  0.0236  
2  28.85128  0.2702  
3  17.52672  0.8618  
4  19.22348  0.7863  
    
    Probs from chi-square with 25 df.  
    
    
    
	
V. Normality	test	
VAR Residual Normality Tests    
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)   
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal   
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:25    
Sample: 1874 1913     
Included observations: 39    
      
            
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.  
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      1 -0.659647  2.828375 1  0.0926  
2 -0.072753  0.034404 1  0.8528  
3 -0.347734  0.785975 1  0.3753  
4 -0.289008  0.542916 1  0.4612  
5  1.556623  15.74999 1  0.0001  
      
      Joint   19.94166 5  0.0013  
      
            
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.  
      
      1  2.646348  0.203238 1  0.6521  
2  2.709267  0.137355 1  0.7109  
3  3.730252  0.866562 1  0.3519  
4  4.223788  2.433692 1  0.1188  
5  7.162635  28.15724 1  0.0000  
      
      Joint   31.79808 5  0.0000  
      
            
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.   
      
      1  3.031614 2  0.2196   
2  0.171759 2  0.9177   
3  1.652537 2  0.4377   
4  2.976608 2  0.2258   
5  43.90723 2  0.0000   
      
      Joint  51.73974 10  0.0000   
      
            
      
      
	
  
Annex	2	
	
I. Changing	the	order	of	variables	(f,	m,	e)	
As	one	can	see	in	footnote	17	the	order	of	variables	can	alter	the	result.	Taking	into	account	the	
fiscal	dominance	(Escario,	Gadea	and	Sabaté,	2011,	pp.	271-272	and	Sabaté,	Gadea	and	Escario,	
2006,	pp.	310,	321	and	328),	one	can	think	that	the	order	for	Spain	could	be	output,	price	index,	
fiscal	balance,	money	stock	and	exchange	rate.	Fiscal	balance	determined	the	debt	monetization	
and,	consequently,	the	quantity	of	banknotes	affected	the	level	of	exchange	rate.	If	we	change	
the	order	of	the	variables,	the	result	of	the	regression	do	not	qualitatively	change.	
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II. Changing	pc	Y	by	Y	
	
III. Changing	M1	(money	stock)	by	M2	
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